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Abstract 
Some epistemic emotions, such as surprise and curiosity, have attracted increasing 
scientific attention, whereas others, such as confusion, have yet to receive the attention they 
deserve. In addition, little is known about the interrelations of these emotions, their joint 
antecedents and outcomes, and how they differ from other emotions prompted during learning 
and knowledge generation (e.g., achievement emotions). In three studies (Ns = 102, 373, 125) 
using a trivia task with immediate feedback, we examined within-person interrelations, 
antecedents, and effects of three epistemic emotions (surprise, curiosity, and confusion). Studies 
2 and 3 additionally included two achievement emotions (pride and shame). Using multilevel 
modeling to disentangle within- and between-person variance, we found that achievement 
emotions were associated with accuracy (i.e., correctness of the answer), whereas epistemic 
emotions were related to high-confidence errors (i.e., incorrect answers a person was confident 
in) generating cognitive incongruity. Furthermore, as compared with achievement emotions, 
epistemic emotions were more strongly and positively related to subsequent knowledge 
exploration. Specifically, surprise and curiosity were positive predictors of exploration. 
Confusion had positive predictive effects on exploration which were significant in Studies 1 and 
3 but not Study 2, suggesting that the effects of confusion are less stable and need to be 
investigated further. Apart from the findings for confusion, the results were fully robust across all 
three studies. They shed light on the distinct origins and outcomes of epistemic emotions. 
Directions for future research and practical implications are discussed. 
 Keywords: epistemic emotion, achievement emotion, cognitive incongruity, knowledge 
exploration, within-person analysis 
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Surprise when learning something unexpected, curiosity when a question remains 
unanswered, and confusion after encountering contradictory information are typical examples of 
epistemic emotions. Epistemic emotions are major drivers of knowledge acquisition about the 
self and the world (Brun, Doğuoğlu, & Kuenzle, 2008). These emotions relate to the knowledge-
generating qualities of cognitive tasks and activities (Morton, 2010) and are thought to be 
critically important for learning, conceptual change, and cognitive performance (Pekrun & 
Stephens, 2012).  
Even though there are long-standing traditions of research on a few epistemic emotions, 
such as surprise and curiosity (Berlyne, 1954; Ekman, 1999), there are notable deficits in the 
study of these emotions. Empirical evidence for epistemic emotions other than surprise and 
curiosity, such as confusion, is scarce and inconclusive (e.g., D’Mello, Lehman, Pekrun, & 
Graesser, 2014). Furthermore, only a few studies (D’Mello & Graesser, 2012; Muis, Pekrun, et 
al., 2015; Muis, Psaradellis, Lajoie, Di Leo, & Chevrier, 2015) have considered several epistemic 
emotions simultaneously to explore their common antecedents and outcomes. Finally, research 
systematically comparing the origins and outcomes of epistemic emotions with the correlates of 
other emotions is lacking. For example, in addition to feeling surprised, curious, or confused, 
individuals whose knowledge is challenged may also feel ashamed when something they thought 
to know turns out to be incorrect, or proud if their knowledge is confirmed. As such, achievement 
emotions may also be prompted in situations with cognitive incongruity. 
It is increasingly recognized that discrete emotions influence cognitive processes in 
different ways (Angie, Connelly, Waples, & Kligyte, 2011; Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011). As 
such, more research is needed to disentangle the antecedents and outcomes of different emotions, 
including different emotions that have the same object focus (e.g., different epistemic emotions) 
and emotions that have different object foci (e.g., epistemic and achievement emotions).  Gaining 
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deeper understanding of the circumstances under which different emotions are experienced and 
how these emotions influence important outcomes may reveal new opportunities for enhancing 
cognitive processes in various contexts that demand cognitive performance (e.g., school, 
university, and the work place).  
In the present research, we sought to address these gaps in the literature by examining 
antecedents and interrelations of three prototypical epistemic emotions (surprise, curiosity, and 
confusion) and two achievement emotions (pride and shame). We also examined the influence of 
these emotions on knowledge exploration. We used a within-person analytic approach to attain a 
more precise understanding of functional relations between variables that is not afforded by 
traditional between-person designs (Molenaar, 2004). To examine the robustness of findings and 
their generalizability across different measures of exploratory behavior, we investigated these 
relations in three independent experimental studies.  
Epistemic Emotions 
The term epistemic emotions was originally coined by philosophers referring to affective 
states that can motivate critical reflection and inquiry (see Brun et al., 2008; Morton, 2010). In 
line with this notion, Pekrun and Stephens (2012) defined epistemic emotions as emotions that 
relate to knowledge and the generation of knowledge. These emotions result from the cognitive 
qualities of knowledge-related tasks and information processing. Specifically, epistemic emotions 
can be prompted by discrepant, contradictory information generating cognitive incongruity. 
Cognitive incongruity is produced when task information deviates from prior expectations or 
beliefs, or when task-related feedback indicates that one’s beliefs are incorrect (high-confidence 
errors; Marshall & Brown, 2006). Other incongruity-inducing scenarios include impasses and 
obstacles to goal attainment that involve contradictory information (D’Mello & Graesser, 2012). 
Encountering contradictory information can interrupt the ongoing cognitive process, result in a 
Running head: EPISTEMIC EMOTIONS AND KNOWLEDGE EXPLORATION  
 
6 
 
reallocation of attention to the unexpected information, and potentially lead to exploration and 
enhanced processing of this information.  
The impact of contradictory information on cognitive processing and behavior may 
depend upon the emotions that are elicited. Tasks that produce cognitive incongruity can trigger a 
number of different epistemic emotions. These include surprise and curiosity; confusion when the 
cognitive incongruity is not resolved; anxiety when the incongruity is extreme and the 
information deeply disturbs existing beliefs; frustration when resolution of incongruity seems 
impossible; and enjoyment and delight when the incongruity is resolved (D’Mello & Graesser, 
2012; Pekrun & Stephens, 2012; Scheffler, 1991; Silvia, 2013). Although curiosity and confusion 
are not part of traditional lists of emotions (e.g., Ekman, 1999), several studies indicate that these 
epistemic states qualify as emotions as defined by multicomponent approaches to emotion 
(Plutchik, 2001; Russell, 2003; Scherer, 2009), because they involve affective feelings, 
physiological arousal, specific motivational impulses, and specific facial expressions (Markey & 
Loewenstein, 2014; Reeve, 1993; Reeve & Nix, 1997; Rozin & Cohen, 2003). These emotions 
can motivate a broad range of activities with epistemic functions. These activities include 
epistemic cognition, “which refers to what individuals think knowledge is and how they think 
that they and others know” (Hofer & Bendixen, 2012, p. 227), as well as actual knowledge-
seeking behavior.  
In the present research, we focus on surprise, curiosity, and confusion as triggered by 
high-confidence errors, that is, unexpected feedback on trivia questions that were answered 
incorrectly although participants had been confident that their answers were correct (i.e., high 
confidence errors). We also investigated the effect of these emotions on participants’ exploration 
of correct answers. In contrast to emotions such as frustration or delight, these three emotions are 
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epistemic in nature; they are associated with antecedents (e.g., cognitive incongruity) and 
outcomes (e.g., knowledge generation) that are particularly important to epistemic emotions.  
Surprise is elicited by unexpected or schema-discrepant events (Berlyne, 1954, 1960; 
Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, 1997; Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013; Noordewier, 
Topolinski, & Van Dijk, 2016; Scherer, 2009; Stiensmeier-Pelster, Martini, & Reisenzein, 1995). 
Surprise has been found to fixate individuals’ gaze (i.e., visual attention) on the unexpected event 
(Horstmann, & Herwig, 2015), promote recall of unexpected events (Parzuchowski & Szymkow-
Sudziarska, 2008), elicit interest (Renninger & Hidi, 2016), and prompt curiosity (Berlyne, 1954, 
1960; Loewenstein, 1994). Based on these findings, we expected surprise to be the initial 
emotional reaction to high-confidence errors, to trigger curiosity and confusion, and to promote 
subsequent exploration of knowledge.  
Curiosity has been defined as a “drive to know” (Berlyne, 1954, p.187). Curiosity is 
aroused by unexpected information or events that reveal gaps in one’s knowledge (Loewenstein, 
1994). Epistemic curiosity is regarded as a means to support learning in educational contexts 
(von Stumm, Hell, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2011) and has been found to promote the exploration 
of new knowledge (Berlyne, 1954, 1960; Litman et al., 2005) and to enhance memory for new 
information (Gruber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 2014; Kang et al., 2009; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016; 
Middlebrooks, McGillivray, Murayama, & Castel, 2016). Accordingly, in the present research, 
we expected curiosity to be triggered by high confidence errors. Furthermore, we expected this 
effect to be mediated by surprise, and curiosity to relate positively to subsequent knowledge 
exploration.  
Confusion occurs when a person is confronted with novel and complex information that is 
not easily understood (Silvia, 2013), or when new information is incongruent with previous 
knowledge and the incongruity cannot be immediately resolved (Pekrun & Stephens, 2012). 
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Confusion can relate positively to task engagement (D’Mello & Graesser, 2012; Bosch & 
D'Mello, 2017), and learning outcomes (Craig, Graesser, Sullins, & Gholson, 2004; D’Mello, 
Lehman, Pekrun, & Graesser, 2014), because impasses (and the associated state of confusion) 
require active engagement and effortful cognitive processing to be overcome (Brown & 
VanLehn, 1980; Mandler, 1990). For confusion to be productive, however, it is crucial that 
incongruity is ultimately resolved (D’Mello & Graesser, 2014; D’Mello et al., 2014). One 
possibility for resolving incongruity is the exploration of new knowledge (Berlyne,1954, 1960). 
In the present research, we expected that the effect of high-confidence errors on confusion is 
mediated by surprise, and that confusion relates positively to subsequent knowledge exploration.  
Achievement Emotions 
Achievement emotions relate to achievement activities and their success and failure 
outcomes (Pekrun, 2006). As such, achievement emotions differ from epistemic emotions in 
terms of their object focus (Brun et al., 2008). As noted, knowledge and the generation of 
knowledge are the objects of epistemic emotions; in achievement emotions, success and failure 
are the objects. Some emotions can be either epistemic or achievement-related, depending on the 
object focus of attention. For example, frustration resulting from an unsolvable problem would be 
considered epistemic, whereas frustration resulting from personal failure would be considered an 
achievement emotion (Pekrun, Vogl, Muis, & Sinatra, 2017). In the present research, we 
considered two prototypical emotions related to success and failure, namely pride and shame. 
Although situations involving cognitive incongruity are thought to trigger epistemic emotions, 
they can also induce achievement emotions if they are interpreted in terms of personal success or 
failure (e.g., being proud if one’s knowledge is confirmed, which can be interpreted as success, or 
feeling ashamed when knowledge turns out to be incorrect, which can be interpreted as failure). 
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Achievement-related pride is triggered by a specific event (e.g., mastering a skill, getting 
a good grade; Tangney, 1999; Tracy & Robins, 2004, 2007) and prompted by success that is 
attributed to internal causes, such as one’s own ability or effort (Pekrun, 2006; Weiner, 1985, 
2010). Pride in one’s success promotes achievement because it is related to task orientation which 
enhances motivation (Oades-Sese, Matthews, & Lewis, 2014). Experimental studies have shown 
that pride can lead to greater perseverance even on effortful and unpleasant tasks related to the 
initial source of pride (Williams & DeSteno, 2008). Similarly, in educational settings, students’ 
pride has been found to promote their interest in the topic, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, 
effort, and academic achievement in the subject (e.g., Pekrun, Lichtenfeld, Marsh, Murayama, & 
Goetz, 2017). As such, the experience of pride after success promotes motivation to engage and 
persevere in ongoing and related tasks and materials. Given that pride is a rewarding experience, 
the function of such engagement likely is to again be successful and experience pride. In general, 
feeling proud about a recognized accomplishment is an incentive to pursue further action in the 
valued domain (e.g., Carver & Johnson, 2010; Williams & DeSteno, 2008). In the present 
research, we expected pride to result from correctly answering the trivia questions, irrespective of 
prior confidence. Furthermore, due to its positive effects on motivation we expected pride after 
correct answers to relate positively to subsequent knowledge exploration. 
Shame is another self-conscious emotions (Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989). In 
achievement contexts, it is triggered by failure that is attributed to internal causes (e.g., lack of 
ability; Pekrun, 2006; Weiner, 1985, 2010). It is a complex emotion that has been associated with 
approach (to regain the positive image that one has lost) and avoidance tendencies (to avoid 
further losses if the positive image cannot be regained; De Hooge, Zeeenberg, and Breugelmans, 
2010). In line with this findings, shame can reduce intrinsic motivation, but also strengthen 
extrinsic motivation to invest effort to avoid failure if a person is confident about their ability 
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(Turner & Schallert, 2001). As such, we expected shame to occur after incorrect answers, 
irrespective of prior confidence or level of cognitive incongruity involved, that is, both when 
participants were confident in their answers (high-confidence errors) and when they were not 
confident in their answers (low-confidence errors). Due to variable effects of shame on 
motivation, we did not formulate a directional hypothesis concerning the relationship of shame 
and knowledge exploration.  
Within- versus Between-Person Approaches to Investigate Emotions 
Numerous emotion theories proffer explanations about the antecedents and effects of 
emotions, and many studies have been carried out to test these theories (for an overview see 
Barrett, Lewis, & Haviland-Jones, 2016). A disparity exists, however, between emotion theory 
and related research: Emotion theories targeting antecedents and effects generally refer to within-
person psychological functioning, while empirical research focused largely on between-person 
designs (see, e.g., Murayama et al., in press; Voelkle, Brose, Schmiedek, & Lindenberger, 2014). 
This is problematic because “[t]hese two correlations [i.e., within-person vs. between-person 
correlations] are statistically independent, and their direction and magnitude can vary widely” 
(Schmitz and Skinner, 1993, p. 1010; Voelkle et al., 2014).  
We argue that within-person approaches are vital for examining the psychological 
mechanisms underlying epistemic and achievement emotions (see also Fastrich, Kerr, Castel, & 
Murayama, 2018; Tanaka & Murayama, 2014). For example, we hypothesize that high-
confidence errors prompt curiosity, which implies a positive relation between these errors and 
curiosity. While this prediction seems plausible, previous studies based on between-person 
designs have shown that people who make fewer errors (i.e., high achievers) are more curious 
(von Stumm et al., 2011), suggesting a negative relationship between errors and curiosity. This 
discrepancy occurs because between-person studies focus on individual differences, ignoring the 
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variation of curiosity, its antecedents, and its effects within persons. Thus, to adequately 
investigate how epistemic emotions arise and function, it is imperative to use a within-person 
approach to examine the relations between variables. 
Aims and Hypotheses of the Present Research 
In three studies we examined the antecedents, interrelations, and effects of multiple 
epistemic emotions (surprise, curiosity, and confusion) and achievement emotions (pride and 
shame, in Studies 2 and 3). The primary focus of our research was on epistemic emotions. As 
such, we decided to implement a low-stakes experimental setting by introducing the task as a 
trivia task and refraining from explicitly emphasizing performance outcomes (i.e., success and 
failure). A high-stakes experimental setting may have been more suited to amplify achievement 
emotions, but may have reduced the occurrence of epistemic emotions. However, pride and 
shame may also occur in low-stakes contexts (even if with lower intensity), for example, due to 
individual propensities to generally value achievement outcomes.  
To elicit the target emotions, all three studies provided feedback on participants’ 
responses to trivia questions. We expected the antecedents of epistemic and achievement 
emotions to differ. Specifically, we expected epistemic emotions to be elicited by high-
confidence errors. To prompt high-confidence errors, we included trivia items that explicitly 
addressed common errors in general knowledge. In contrast, we expected achievement emotions 
to be elicited by correctly (success) or incorrectly (failure) answering trivia questions, 
irrespective of the confidence participants had in their answers. Furthermore, we expected all 
three epistemic emotions to promote knowledge exploration. Specifically, we expected the effects 
of surprise on exploration to be mediated by curiosity and confusion. We did not expect a direct 
effect of surprise on exploration (i.e., an effect not mediated by curiosity or confusion). To our 
knowledge, there is no theory or empirical evidence that would support such a direct effect. 
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Rather, there is theoretical support for our hypothesized link between surprise and curiosity 
(Berlyne, 1954, 1960; Loewenstein, 1994), and for surprise and confusion (e.g., D’Mello & 
Graesser, 2012). Curiosity and confusion, in turn, have been linked to knowledge exploration in 
previous work (e.g., Berlyne, 1954, 1960; Litman, Hutchings & Russon, 2005). As for the 
achievement emotions considered, we expected pride experienced after correct responses to also 
promote exploration. With regard to the relation between shame and knowledge exploration, no 
specific hypotheses were formulated. The focal hypotheses tested were as follows (see Figure 1): 
Hypothesis 1: Antecedents of epistemic emotions. High-confidence errors positively 
predict surprise, curiosity, and confusion (Figure 1, paths a-c).   
Hypothesis 2: Outcomes of epistemic emotions. Surprise positively predicts curiosity 
and confusion (Figure 1, paths b and c), and curiosity and confusion positively predict 
exploration (paths d and e). As such, curiosity and confusion are mediators in the surprise-
exploration relation (paths b + d and c + e, respectively). We did not expect a direct effect of 
surprise on exploration. 
Hypothesis 3: Epistemic emotions as mediators in the effects of high-confidence 
errors on exploration. High-confidence errors positively predict knowledge exploration. 
Epistemic emotions are mediators in the error-exploration relation (Figure 1, paths a + b + d and 
a + c + e, respectively).  
Hypothesis 4: Antecedents of achievement emotions. Correct answers (success) 
positively predict pride, and incorrect answers (failure) positively predict shame (Figure 1, paths f 
and g).   
Hypothesis 5: Outcomes of achievement emotions. Pride positively predicts knowledge 
exploration; we leave as an exploratory question whether the relationship between shame and 
knowledge exploration is positive or negative (Figure 1, paths h and i).  
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Study 1 
Study 1 focused on epistemic emotions. More specifically, this study examined high-
confidence errors as an antecedent of surprise, curiosity, and confusion, and subsequent 
motivation to explore the correct answer as an outcome of these emotions. 
Method 
Participants. One hundred-two participants (67 females) from a German university 
completed the study online (age range 19 to 30 years, M = 23.33, SD = 2.55). Participants were 
recruited and sent a link to the online questionnaire via the university’s mailing list and a 
university-related Facebook page. Participants were informed that the study would take 
approximately 12 to 14 minutes and, as an incentive, they were told that after completing the 
study they would be entered into a lottery to win one of two 20 Euro gift cards for a well-known 
internet shopping company.  
Materials. The trivia task used consisted of 20 single-sentence statements compiled from 
various sources that tap into general knowledge in several domains (Ebert & Klotzek, 2008, 
2010; Nelson & Narens, 1980; Pöppelmann, 2009). To ensure sufficient within-person variance, 
we selected statements that varied in the degree to which they produced high-confidence errors. 
Specifically, we included statements that are likely to produce high-confidence errors because 
they target widespread errors in general knowledge (e.g., “Chameleons match their color to their 
environment”) as well as statements about well-known facts that were not expected to 
particularly induce high-confidence errors (e.g., “Jupiter is the largest planet of our solar system”; 
see Supplemental Materials available online for a list of all items, Table S2). One particular 
advantage of this trivia task is that high-confidence errors - and thus epistemic emotions - can be 
elicited repeatedly by choosing trivia items from different domains (Reisenzein, 2000). 
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Procedure and measures. Participants were presented with the 20 trivia statements and 
instructed to indicate whether the statement was correct or incorrect. After making their decision, 
participants were asked to indicate how confident they felt about their answer using a 6-point 
Likert scale (1 = very uncertain to 6 = very certain). Participants immediately received feedback 
about the accuracy of their reply (Your answer is correct” vs. “Your answer is incorrect”). Next, 
participants were asked to rate how they felt at that very moment. Using short one-item scales of 
the Epistemic Emotions Scales (Pekrun et al., 2017), participants rated how surprised, curious, 
and confused they were on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all to 5 = very strong). After 
completion of the trivia question trials, participants were presented with a list of those statements 
they had answered incorrectly. Finally, to measure participants’ motivation to explore the correct 
answers for these statements, they were asked to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale their 
motivation to explore the correct answer for each of the answers that had been incorrect (“How 
strong is your desire to receive an explanation for your incorrect answer?”; 1 = very weak to 5 = 
very strong). As participants were not provided with information about the correct answers, this 
measure specifically tapped into motivation to explore rather than actual exploratory behavior. 
The study has received approval from the research ethics committee of the first author’s 
institution.  
Data analysis. The data have a two-level hierarchical structure with trivia statements 
(Level 1) nested within individuals (Level 2). We used multilevel modeling with Mplus 8 to 
model within- and between-person relations in these nested data (Muthén & Muthén, 2017). 
Accuracy (0 = incorrect; 1 = correct), confidence, and their interaction term were modeled as 
predictors of emotions at Level 1. Accuracy and confidence were standardized before creating the 
interaction term. Subsequently, following recommendations for within- and between-person 
multilevel modeling, the predictors were centered within each individual to avoid confounding 
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within- and between-person effects (see Enders & Tofighi, 2007; Wang & Maxwell, 2015). The 
intercepts of the predictors were allowed to vary across individuals (Level 2). To control for 
possible order- and time-dependent effects, we controlled for trial order by including order as a 
covariate at Level 1 (Wang & Maxwell, 2015). Our sample included more than 100 participants 
on L2 with 20 trials on L1. This sample size is in line with Arend and Schäfer’s (2018) 
recommendations for two-level models to ensure sufficient power (≥ .80) for detecting small, 
medium, and large L1 effects (i.e., effects larger than .10, .30, and .50, respectively; see Arend & 
Schäfer, 2018, Table 5). All data can be downloaded from https://osf.io/vw2cn/. 
We estimated two multilevel models to test our directional hypotheses. In Model 1, we 
explored response accuracy, response confidence, and the accuracy x confidence interaction as 
antecedents of the emotions to test our hypothesis that high-confidence errors induce epistemic 
emotions (Hypothesis 1). If high-confidence errors prompt epistemic emotions, the accuracy x 
confidence interaction should predict these emotions. The model included within-person paths 
from all three predictors to the three emotions and additionally included the covariances among 
the predictors and among the residuals of the emotions. Because we aimed to test our hypotheses 
at Level 1, Level-2 relations between variables were simply estimated as covariances. The model 
was saturated.  
In Model 2, we examined the simple effects of confidence in incorrect answers, thus 
decomposing the accuracy x interaction term to better understand its effects. This also made it 
possible to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated. In addition to confidence and 
emotions, the model included participants’ motivation to explore (which had been assessed for 
incorrect answers only). As such, this model more fully tested the proposed sequence of 
confidence in incorrect answers, epistemic emotions, and exploration. The emotions were 
organized sequentially, with surprise predicting curiosity and confusion, which jointly predict 
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motivation to explore (Hypotheses 2 and 3; see Figure 2). Indirect effects of confidence on 
exploration as mediated by the emotions were tested using 95% bootstrap confidence intervals. 
Again, the Level 2 relations between variables were estimated as covariances. In supplemental 
analyses, we evaluated alternative models testing other sequential orders of the emotions (see 
Supplemental Materials). 
To evaluate the fit of Model 2, we used the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis 
index (TLI), the root-mean-square-error of approximation (RMSEA), and the standardized-root-
mean residual (SRMR). For CFI and TLI, values greater or equal to .95 for CFI are traditionally 
interpreted as indicating good fit and values between .90 and .95 as indicating moderate fit (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999). For RMSEA and SRMR, as recommended by Hu and Bentler (1999), we 
interpreted values smaller or equal to .06 as indicating good fit and values between .06 and .08 as 
indicating moderate fit. While these recommended cut-off values provide information for 
gauging model fit, it is important to bear in mind that one should interpret general cut-off values 
carefully (Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004).  
Results 
Preliminary analysis. Although there was variation at the between-person level for all 
emotions (ICCs ranged from .16 to .29), the major part of the variance was at the within-person 
level, as indicated by the intra-class correlations (ICCs; Table 1). Table 1 also shows the 
descriptive statistics at the between-person level as well as the between- and within-person 
correlations for the study variables. At the within-person level, all correlations between 
confidence and epistemic emotions as well as motivation to explore were significant. Correlations 
between the observed variables were mostly positive at both levels, with the exception of a 
negative within-person correlation between participants’ confidence in their answers and their 
curiosity.   
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Antecedents of epistemic emotions (Model 1). Table 2 displays the within-person path 
coefficients for accuracy, confidence and the accuracy x confidence interaction as predictors of 
epistemic emotions. Accuracy negatively predicted all three emotions, suggesting that the 
emotions were generated by errors (i.e., incorrect answers). Furthermore, supporting Hypothesis 
1, the accuracy x confidence interaction was a strong negative predictor of all three emotions 
indicating that high-confidence errors elicited epistemic emotions (i.e., there were positive effects 
of confidence in incorrect answers on these emotions). 
Effects and interrelations of epistemic emotions (Model 2). Table 4 displays the path 
coefficients for Model 2. The model (see Figure 2) showed a good fit to the data χ2(1) = 3.832, p 
= .050; CFI = .997; TLI = .935; RMSEA = .055; SRMRwithin = .010. As expected, high-
confidence errors positively predicted surprise, and surprise, in turn, positively predicted 
curiosity and confusion. In addition, high-confidence errors had a significant direct positive effect 
on confusion, whereas the direct effect on curiosity was not significant.  
Supporting Hypothesis 2, curiosity and confusion were positive predictors of motivation 
to explore. In line with the surprise-exploration relation hypothesis, surprise had a positive 
indirect effect on motivation mediated by curiosity, and a positive indirect effect on motivation 
mediated by confusion. In line with the error-exploration relation hypothesis (Hypothesis 3), 
confidence in incorrect answers positively predicted motivation. Specifically, confidence had 
both a direct effect on motivation as well as indirect effects mediated by surprise and curiosity 
and by surprise and confusion.  
Discussion  
Study 1 examined cognitive incongruity as an antecedent of epistemic emotions and 
motivation for exploratory behavior as one type of knowledge-generating activity resulting from 
these emotions. In preliminary correlational analyses, there were differences in the within- versus 
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between-person relations of emotions with response accuracy, confidence, and knowledge 
exploration. Clearly, the within-person correlations were more consistent and fully in line with 
the hypotheses. This highlights the importance of using a within-person approach to investigate 
these linkages. The results of multilevel modeling indicate that high-confidence errors serve as 
antecedents of surprise, curiosity, and confusion within persons (e.g., Pekrun & Stephens, 2012; 
D’Mello & Graesser, 2012). The results further suggest that surprise mediates the effects of high-
confidence errors on curiosity and confusion (see also D’Mello & Graesser, 2012; Loewenstein, 
1994; Scherer, 2009). Furthermore, as hypothesized, the analyses indicate that both curiosity and 
confusion can have positive effects on motivation to explore knowledge. High-confidence errors 
increased the motivation to explore, and this relationship was mediated by epistemic emotions. In 
sum, our findings were in line with the hypotheses and suggest that cognitively incongruous task 
information can trigger surprise, which in turn can trigger curiosity and confusion, both of which 
contribute to the motivation to explore new information.  
Study 2 
Study 1 included motivation to explore but not actual exploratory behavior as an outcome 
variable. Furthermore, Study 1 only investigated epistemic emotions. To gain a better 
understanding of epistemic emotions, it is important to compare their antecedents and outcomes 
to those of other emotions that may or may not be experienced in the same setting. Therefore, 
Study 2 aimed to replicate the findings of Study 1 and to extend them by including a measure of 
actual behavior as well as two achievement emotions, namely pride and shame.  
Method 
Participants. Three hundred-seventy-three participants (245 females) from a German 
university completed this study online (age range 18 to 30 years, M = 22.20, SD =2.75). 
Participants were recruited and sent a link to the online questionnaire via the university’s mailing 
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list and a university-related Facebook page. Participants were informed that the study would take 
approximately 12 to 14 minutes. As an incentive, they were told that after completing the study 
they would be entered into a lottery to win one of two 20 Euro gift cards for a well-known 
internet shopping company.  
Materials, procedure, and measures. Study 2 used the same task materials, procedure, 
and measures of confidence and emotions as Study 1. The trivia statements were presented in a 
randomized order. Two amendments were made to the design. First, after receiving feedback, 
participants additionally rated the extent to which they felt proud and ashamed (1 = not at all to 5 
= very strong). Second, instead of asking for participants’ motivation to explore after all the trivia 
question trials, participants were given the opportunity to actually request and read an 
explanation why their answer was incorrect directly each time after they received negative 
feedback (“Would you like to know why your answer was incorrect?” [0 = No vs. 1 = Yes]). If 
requested, the explanation was displayed.  We ensured that participants had not participated in 
Study 1 by asking them if they had participated in a similar study before. Twenty-six individuals 
reported having done so and were thus excluded from the present study. The study has received 
approval from the research ethics committee of the first author’s institution.  
Data analysis. As in Study 1, the data were analyzed using multilevel modeling with 
trivia statements (Level 1) nested within individuals (Level 2). We used the same method of 
analysis as in Study 1. Pride and shame were added in Model 2. We included the effects of 
confidence on pride and shame, and the effects of these emotions on exploratory behavior. Our 
sample included more than 100 participants on L2 with 20 trials on L1. This sample size is in line 
with Arend and Schäfer’s (2018) recommendations for two-level models to ensure sufficient 
power (≥ .80) for detecting small, medium, and large L1 effects (i.e., effects larger than .10, .30, 
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and .50, respectively; see Arend & Schäfer, 2018, Table 5). All data can be downloaded from 
https://osf.io/vw2cn/. 
Results 
Preliminary findings. Replicating the findings from Study 1, there was variation at the 
between-person level for all emotions (ICCs ranged from .13 to .31), but the major part of the 
variance was located at the within-person level. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics at the 
between-person level as well as between-person and within-person correlations. The findings 
indicate that there was sufficient score variation for all study variables, although there was some 
restriction of variance for the exploration scores due to ceiling effects (participants requested 
information about the correct answer in most cases). Correlations between the observed variables 
were mostly in line with the findings of Study 1.  
Antecedents of epistemic and achievement emotions (Model 1). Table 2 and Table 3 
display the standardized within-person path coefficients for accuracy, confidence, and the 
accuracy x confidence interaction as predictors of the epistemic and achievement emotions, 
respectively. As in Study 1, the model was saturated. Replicating the findings of Study 1, 
accuracy negatively predicted all three epistemic emotions. Furthermore, as in Study 1, the 
accuracy x confidence interaction negatively predicted all three emotions showing that high-
confidence errors elicited epistemic emotions (i.e., there were positive effects of confidence in 
incorrect answers on these emotions).Supporting Hypothesis 1, this finding indicates that high-
confidence errors elicited epistemic emotions.  
Furthermore, in line with Hypothesis 4, accuracy positively predicted pride and negatively 
predicted shame. In addition, the accuracy x confidence interaction term positively predicted 
pride and negatively predicted shame, indicating that pride was more intensely experienced in 
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case of correct answers the participants were confident in, and shame was more intensely 
experienced in case of incorrect answers the participants were confident in.  
Effects and interrelations of epistemic and achievement emotions (Model 2). Table 4 
displays the path coefficients for Model 2. The model (see Figure 2) showed a good fit to the 
data, χ2(1) = 2.777, p = .095; CFI = 1.000; TLI = .980; RMSEA = .024; SRMRwithin = .003. In 
line with Hypothesis 1, high-confidence errors positively predicted surprise. Surprise, in turn, 
positively predicted curiosity and confusion. High-confidence errors were not a direct predictor 
of curiosity, supporting mediation of the effects on curiosity by surprise. Pride was unrelated to 
high-confidence errors, likely due to a floor effect in pride after incorrect answers (M = 1.06; SD 
= 0.20). However, shame was positively predicted by high-confidence errors.    
Replicating the Study 1 findings and supporting Hypothesis 2, curiosity positively 
predicted exploration. Confusion, however, did not significantly predict exploration. In line with 
the surprise-exploration relation hypothesis, surprise had a positive indirect effect on exploration 
mediated by curiosity. The indirect effect of surprise on exploration mediated by confusion was 
not significant. In contrast to surprise and curiosity, neither pride nor shame predicted exploratory 
behavior.  
Furthermore, in line with the error-exploration relation hypothesis (Hypothesis 3), high-
confidence errors had a positive predictive effect on exploration that was mediated by surprise 
and curiosity. The indirect effect of high-confidence errors on exploration mediated by surprise 
and confusion was not significant. Supporting the mediating role of surprise and curiosity, the 
direct effect of high-confidence errors on exploration was not significant.  
Discussion 
Study 2 aimed to replicate the findings of Study 1 and to extend them by exploring the 
differences in the antecedents and effects of epistemic versus achievement emotions and by 
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including actual exploratory behavior as an outcome variable. In support of Hypothesis 1 and 
replicating Study 1, high-confidence errors served as antecedents of surprise, curiosity and 
confusion. As for achievement emotions, accuracy promoted pride and inaccuracy promoted 
shame, in line with Hypothesis 4 and the control-value theory of achievement emotions (Pekrun, 
2006). Furthermore, the intensity with which participants experienced pride and shame was also 
dependent on participants’ confidence in their answers: High-confidence errors induced more 
shame than low-confidence errors, and high-confidence correct answers induced more pride than 
low-confidence correct answers. However, the findings suggest that the accuracy x confidence 
interaction more strongly influenced epistemic emotions than achievement emotions (β range -
.257 to -.423 for the epistemic emotions in Table 2, and .127 and -.158 for pride and shame in 
Table 3, respectively).  
In line with Hypothesis 3, surprise positively predicted actual exploratory behavior via 
curiosity. Confusion also had a positive predictive effect on exploration; however, in contrast to 
Study 1, this effect was not significant due to its small magnitude. One possible explanation for 
small effect size could be variable effects of confusion. For instance, confusion may lead to 
increased motivation if a person has positive expectancies to resolve cognitive incongruity but 
reduced motivation if these expectancies are low (D’Mello et al., 2014; Pekrun & Stephens, 
2012). With small effect sizes, coefficients can be non-significant by chance (i.e., due to 
sampling error). In addition, our results highlight the proposed mediating role of surprise and 
curiosity in the relationship between high-confidence errors and exploration (Berlyne, 1960; 
Litman et al., 2005; Loewenstein, 1994). 
As for achievement emotions, neither pride nor shame was significantly related to 
exploration. For pride, one likely reason is that exploration was only offered after incorrect 
answers. It seems plausible that pride does not occur after incorrect answers, implying that it 
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cannot contribute to explaining subsequent behavior. This explanation is supported by the present 
data, which showed a floor effect for pride ratings after incorrect answers. The result for shame 
may indicate that this negative but activating emotion need not have detrimental effects on 
knowledge generation. This is in line with findings suggesting that shame, in contrast to negative 
deactivating emotions like boredom (Pekrun, Hall, Goetz, & Perry, 2014; Pekrun et al., 2017; 
Tze, Daniels, & Klassen, 2015), has variable effects and may not reduce motivation and 
performance under all circumstances (e.g., Turner & Schallert, 2001).  
Study 3 
Study 3 aimed to replicate the findings of Study 1 and 2 and to further expand on them in 
two important ways. First, we included a more extensive measure of exploratory behavior 
comprising multiple opportunities to request information. Second, we examined exploratory 
behavior using this measure not only after incorrect answers but also after correct answers to 
obtain a more complete picture of the relations between performance feedback, emotions, and 
subsequent exploration. This makes it possible to compare the relations between all of the study 
variables across instances of correct and incorrect answers.  
Method 
Participants. One hundred twenty-five participants (90 females) from a German 
university completed this study online (age range 18 to 30 years, M = 22.69, SD = 2.70). 
Participants were recruited and sent a link to the online questionnaire via the university’s mailing 
list and a university-related Facebook page. Participants were informed that the study would take 
approximately 30 minutes. As an incentive, they were told that after completing the study they 
would be entered into a lottery to win one of two 20 Euro gift cards for a well-known internet 
shopping company. 
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Materials, procedure, and measures. Study 3 used the same materials, procedure, and 
measures as Study 2. However, participants were provided with the opportunity to request and 
read an explanation after both correct and incorrect answers (“Would you like to see the 
explanation now?” [No vs. Yes]). If requested, the explanation was displayed. In addition to this 
explanation, participants were able to request up to two more pieces of information for each 
statement. After the explanation had been displayed, they were asked if they wanted more 
information (“Would you like to receive more information concerning this topic?” [No vs. Yes]). 
An additional piece of information was displayed if the answer was yes. Subsequently, using the 
same question they were asked one more time if they would like to receive more information. 
The initial explanations as well as the additional two pieces of information consisted of 16 words 
each. Based on this design, exploration was defined as the number of participants’ requests for 
information [0 to 3 for each question]. We ensured that participants had not participated in Study 
1 or 2 by asking them if they had participated in a similar study before. Three individuals 
reported having done so and were thus excluded from the present study. The study has received 
approval from the research ethics committee of the first author’s institution.  
Data analysis. As in Studies 1 and 2, the data were analyzed using multilevel modeling 
with trivia statements (Level 1) nested within individuals (Level 2). We used the same method of 
analysis as in Study 2. Model 2 assessing simple effects of confidence on emotions and behavior 
was estimated separately for confidence in incorrect answers (high-confidence errors; Model 2a) 
and confidence in correct answers (Model 2b). Our sample included more than 100 participants 
on L2 with 20 trials on L1. This sample size is in line with Arend and Schäfer’s (2018) 
recommendations for two-level models to ensure sufficient power (≥ .80) for detecting small, 
medium, and large L1 effects (i.e., effects larger than .10, .30, and .50, respectively; see Arend & 
Schäfer, 2018, Table 5). All data can be downloaded from https://osf.io/vw2cn/. 
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Results 
Preliminary findings. Replicating the findings from Studies 1 and 2, variation of the 
emotion scores at the within-person level outweighed variation at the between-person level (ICCs 
ranged from .02 to .56). Table 1 shows descriptive statistics at the between-person level as well 
as the between-person and within-person correlations. The findings indicate that there was 
sufficient score variation for all study variables. Correlations between the observed variables 
were largely in line with the findings of Studies 1 and 2.  
Antecedents of epistemic and achievement emotions (Model 1). Table 2 and Table 3 
display the standardized within-person path coefficients for accuracy, confidence, and the 
accuracy x confidence interaction as predictors of the epistemic and achievement emotions, 
respectively. As in Studies 1 and 2, the model was saturated. Replicating the Study 1 and 2 
findings, accuracy negatively predicted all three epistemic emotions. Furthermore, as in Studies 1 
and 2, and supporting Hypothesis 1, the accuracy x confidence interaction was a negative 
predictor of all three emotions, again confirming that high-confidence errors elicited epistemic 
emotions (i.e., there were positive effects of confidence in incorrect answers on these emotions). 
Furthermore, in line with Hypothesis 4 and the findings of Study 2, accuracy again 
positively predicted pride and negatively predicted shame. In addition, the accuracy x confidence 
interaction term positively predicted pride and negatively predicted shame, indicating that pride 
was more intensely experienced in case of correct answers the participants were very confident 
in, and shame was more intensely experienced in case of incorrect answers the participants were 
very confident in.  
Effects and interrelations of epistemic and achievement emotions (Model 2). Table 5 
displays the path coefficients for Model 2. Both Models 2a and 2b showed a good fit to the data 
(Model 2a, confidence in incorrect answers: χ2(1) = .951, p = .329; CFI = 1.00; TLI = 1.00; 
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RMSEA = .000; SRMRwithin = .003; Model 2b, confidence in correct answers: χ2(1) = .568, p = 
.451; CFI = .1.00; TLI = 1.01; RMSEA = .000; SRMRwithin = .003: Figure 3). In line with 
Hypothesis 1 and replicating the Study 1 and 2 findings, high-confidence errors positively 
predicted surprise. In contrast, confidence in correct answers negatively predicted surprise. 
Surprise, in turn, positively predicted curiosity and confusion in both models. Pride was unrelated 
to high-confidence errors, likely due to floor effects in the ratings for pride after incorrect 
answers (M = 1.03, SD = .09). However, pride was positively predicted by confidence in correct 
answers. Conversely, shame was positively predicted by high-confidence errors but not 
significantly predicted by confidence in correct answers, likely due to floor effects in the ratings 
for shame after correct answers (M = 1.05, SD = .11).  
Supporting Hypothesis 2 and in line with Studies 1 and 2, curiosity positively predicted 
exploration, both after incorrect and correct answers. In addition, confusion positively predicted 
exploration; this effect was significant after incorrect answers but was weak and not significant 
after correct answers, likely due to floor effects in confusion after correct answers (M = 1.15, SD 
= .62). Surprise also was a positive predictor of exploration. Specifically, following incorrect 
answers, surprise had positive indirect effects on exploration that were mediated by curiosity and 
confusion, supporting the surprise-exploration relation hypothesis. Following correct answers, 
surprise had a positive indirect effect on exploration mediated by curiosity; the indirect effect 
mediated by confusion was not significant. Supporting Hypothesis 5, pride positively predicted 
exploration after correct answers. Shame did not significantly predict exploration.  
In line with the error-exploration relation hypothesis (Hypothesis 3), high-confidence 
errors positively predicted exploratory behavior. Specifically, there were indirect effects of 
confidence in incorrect answers on exploration that were mediated by surprise and curiosity and 
by surprise and confusion. Further supporting mediation, the direct effect of confidence in 
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incorrect answers on exploration was not significant. In contrast, confidence in correct answers 
negatively predicted exploration. There was a direct negative effect of confidence in correct 
answers, an indirect negative effect mediated by surprise, and a non-significant indirect negative 
effect mediated by confusion.  
Discussion 
Study 3 aimed to replicate the findings of Studies 1 and 2 and to expand on them by using 
a more extensive measure of exploratory behavior. In addition, exploratory behavior was 
assessed both after incorrectly and correctly answered items. In line with Studies 1 and 2, high-
confidence errors positively predicted surprise, curiosity and confusion. As expected, the 
achievement emotions pride and shame were triggered by positive and negative feedback, 
respectively (Pekrun, 2006). In addition, pride and shame again depended on participants’ 
confidence in their answers: High-confidence in incorrect answers induced more shame than 
errors accompanied by low-confidence; conversely, high-confidence in correct answers induced 
more pride than correct answers accompanied by low-confidence. However, as in Studies 1 and 
2, the accuracy x confidence interaction influenced epistemic emotions more strongly than 
achievement emotions (β range -.349 to -.520 for the epistemic emotions in Table 2, and .130 and 
-.166 for pride and shame in Table 3, respectively).  
As expected, surprise and curiosity positively predicted actual exploratory behavior, both 
after incorrect and correct answers. Curiosity was a mediator in the effects of surprise. However, 
the positive effect of confusion on exploration that we found in Study 1 was only partly 
replicated in Study 3. Confusion promoted exploratory behavior after incorrect answers, but not 
after correctly answered items. This result is not surprising since confusion is not likely to occur 
after successful task performance, as documented in the floor effects for the confusion ratings 
after correct answers. Furthermore, replicating the Study 1 and 2 findings, high-confidence errors 
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positively predicted exploration. As expected, epistemic emotions were mediators in the effects 
of errors on exploration. In contrast, confidence in correct answers negatively predicted 
exploration, suggesting that motivation to explore is undermined when prior beliefs in the 
accuracy of one’s answer are confirmed.  
In line with our hypotheses, pride after correct answers positively predicted further 
exploration. In contrast, replicating the Study 2 findings, incorrect answers did not result in pride, 
which explains why pride did not contribute to explaining exploration after incorrect answers. 
Finally, as in Study 2, shame was not significantly related to exploration, supporting the 
assumption that shame can have variable effects and need not be detrimental for exploration and 
knowledge generation. 
General Discussion 
The present research aimed to examine antecedents and functions of epistemic emotions. 
Our research questions and hypotheses were grounded in theoretical considerations on epistemic 
emotions (e.g., Pekrun & Stephens, 2012; Loewenstein, 1994; Berlyne, 1960; D’Mello 
& Graesser, 2012) and achievement emotions (Pekrun, 2006; Pekrun & Perry, 2014; Weiner, 
1985, 2010). Specifically, in three independent experimental studies, we used within-person 
analysis to investigate cognitive incongruity prompted by high-confidence errors during a trivia 
task as an antecedent of multiple epistemic emotions, namely surprise, curiosity and confusion. 
Exploration of knowledge was assessed as an outcome of these three emotions. In addition, we 
compared the epistemic emotions with two achievement emotions, pride and shame, in terms of 
their antecedents and functions for exploration. Apart from the relation between confusion and 
exploration, the findings were remarkably consistent across all three studies and fully supported 
our hypotheses.  
Antecedents of Epistemic Emotions  
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As expected, the results point to distinct patterns of antecedents for epistemic and 
achievement emotions: The trivia task with immediate achievement feedback induced both 
epistemic and achievement emotions but under different circumstances. Specifically, as expected, 
pride was predicted by correct answers (i.e., success), and shame was predicted by incorrect 
answers (i.e., failure; e.g., Pekrun et al., 2017). The effects of correct versus incorrect answers on 
pride and shame were quite substantial (range of standardized path coefficients -.352 - .662; 
Table 3) and fully consistent across Studies 2 and 3 which had assessed these emotions. Similar 
to shame, the epistemic emotions surprise, curiosity, and confusion were also triggered by 
inaccuracy. However, supporting our hypotheses, the effects of inaccuracy on these emotions 
were specified by an interaction with prior confidence in the accuracy of the answer. Surprise, 
curiosity, and confusion were induced by high-confidence errors; the intensity of these emotions 
depended on participants’ confidence in the answers that turned out to be incorrect, implying 
incongruity between prior beliefs and the correct answer. The link between high-confidence 
errors and epistemic emotions was also quite substantial (range of standardized path coefficients 
for the effects of the accuracy x confidence interaction -.239 to -.520, Table 2), and it was fully 
robust across all three studies and all three epistemic emotions.  
Furthermore, the effects of the accuracy x confidence interaction observed across Studies 
2 and 3 indicate that confidence in correct answers was positively linked to pride, and confidence 
in incorrect answers was positively linked to shame. Importantly, however, these relationships 
were relatively weak, and notably weaker than those observed for surprise, curiosity, and 
confusion, suggesting that confidence in one’s knowledge is less relevant for the arousal of 
achievement emotions as compared with epistemic emotions.  
Taken together, these findings elucidate potential causes of epistemic emotions and 
suggest that metacognitive processes play an important role in their occurrence. The results 
Running head: EPISTEMIC EMOTIONS AND KNOWLEDGE EXPLORATION  
 
30 
 
highlight that cognitive incongruity functions as an antecedent of epistemic emotions that is both 
common to the three epistemic emotions investigated, and more important to these emotions than 
to achievement emotions. As such, the findings support propositions that cognitive incongruity is 
a prime driver of epistemic emotions (Berlyne, 1960; D’Mello & Graesser, 2012; Loewenstein, 
1994; Pekrun & Stephens, 2012; Silvia, 2013). More specifically, they highlight the critical role 
of judgments of confidence in the accuracy of one’s knowledge for the experience of surprise, 
curiosity, and confusion.  
With regard to surprise, our results are congruent with empirical evidence on the 
hypercorrection effect, that is, the phenomenon that individuals are more likely to attempt to 
rectify high-confidence errors as compared with low-confidence errors (Butterfield & Metcalfe, 
2001). The present studies support Metcalfe, Butterfield, Habeck, and Stern’s (2012) observation 
that error correction is in fact not a “cool” (i.e., unemotional) cognitive process as originally 
proposed by Metcalfe and Mischel (1999). Neurophysiological studies relating the 
hypercorrection effect to brain regions such as the medial frontal gyrus, which is also involved in 
the conscious monitoring of emotional states (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002), further 
support the proposed link between metacognition and epistemic emotions. 
The result further shed light on the dynamic interplay of multiple epistemic emotions 
suggesting that surprise may precede curiosity (Loewenstein, 1994) and confusion (D’Mello & 
Graesser, 2012). However, in the present research, the data on the temporal ordering of surprise, 
curiosity, and confusion are correlational; as such, the approach pursued herein needs to be 
complemented with experimental studies. Similarly, future research will need to examine how 
curiosity can be fostered without simultaneously promoting confusion. To this end, it may be 
useful to consider additional antecedents of epistemic emotions such as task-related expectancies 
of success (Muis, Psaradellis, et al., 2015; Pekrun & Perry, 2014), distal antecedents such as 
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epistemic beliefs (Muis, Chevrier, & Singh, 2018; Muis, Pekrun, et al., 2015; Trevors, Muis, 
Pekrun, Sinatra & Muijselaar, 2017), or personality traits that influence how individuals react to 
unexpected information (e.g., need for structure or openness to experience; Gocłowska, Baas, 
Crisp, & De Dreu, 2014; Gocłowska, Baas, Elliot, & De Dreu, 2017).  
Outcomes of Epistemic Emotions  
Our findings further corroborate prior research suggesting positive effects of curiosity on 
knowledge-generating behavior (e.g., Litman et al., 2005). Specifically, the data demonstrate that 
both surprise and curiosity related positively to subsequent motivation to explore (Study 1) as 
well as actual exploratory behavior (Studies 2 and 3). These links were fully robust across all 
three studies and across correctly as well as incorrectly answered trivia questions. The findings 
further suggest that cognitive incongruity promotes exploration, and that surprise and curiosity 
are mediators in this relationship.  
For confusion, the findings were somewhat less consistent. Confusion did not relate to 
exploration after correct answers, which is well explained by floor effects in the occurrence of 
this emotion after correct answers. Confusion after incorrect answers positively predicted 
exploration, in line with prior evidence indicating that confusion can promote cognitive 
performance (D’Mello et al., 2014); however, these effects were relatively weak, and they were 
significant in Studies 1 and 3 but not in Study 2. These small effect sizes for confusion could be 
due to variable effects of negative activating emotions, such as confusion, on motivation and 
behavior (Pekrun & Stephens, 2012). It is possible that confusion strengthens motivation to 
explore in individuals who expect to successfully resolve their confusion, but undermines 
motivation and knowledge exploration in persons who expect that the resolution of confusion is 
less likely. Low expectations could drive these individuals to withdraw from, rather than persist 
through, the task at hand. Analyzing persons with low and high expectancies simultaneously will 
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lead to low effect sizes, which can vary in significance due to sampling error. Supporting this 
interpretation, the confidence intervals for the effects of confusion from the three studies overlap 
(see Table 4 and Table 5), indicating that the effects were not significantly different across 
studies and suggesting that the differences in effect size were indeed caused by sampling error. 
As such, in line with extant theoretical perspectives (Pekrun & Stephens, 2012), the present 
results suggest that the effects of confusion on motivation can be difficult to anticipate and to 
predict in any given sample and context. To gain a better understanding of confusion, future 
research should explore confusion during other cognitive tasks and in relation to various types of 
motivation to perform these tasks and different types of obstacles encountered during task 
performance.   
As for achievement emotions, pride experienced after correctly answered items had 
positive effects on knowledge exploration, in line with prior findings on positive relations 
between pride and performance (e.g., Pekrun et al., 2002). In contrast, there were null relations 
between shame and exploration. Similar to the variable effects of confusion, this finding is 
consistent with theoretical perspectives and prior evidence that the effects of activating negative 
emotions can be complex and result in zero correlations with overall measures of performance 
(Pekrun & Stephens, 2012; Turner & Schallert, 2001).  
In sum, the findings are well in line with our study hypotheses and replicated across 
multiple independent studies (three for epistemic emotions, two for achievement emotions), the 
only exception being the somewhat variable results for the relation between confusion and 
exploration that are likely attributable to the weak overall relation between these variables. The 
results document reliable effects of task feedback and prior confidence on surprise, curiosity, 
confusion, pride, and shame as well as positive effects of surprise, curiosity, and pride after 
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correct answers on subsequent knowledge exploration. Clearly, more research is needed to more 
fully understand the relationship between confusion and epistemic behavior.  
Implications for Research and Practice 
The results of the present within-person analyses support emotion theories that focus on 
within-person psychological functioning (e.g., D’Mello & Graesser, 2012; Scherer, 2009; Pekrun, 
2006). Our correlational findings point to some discrepancies across the within-person and 
between-person levels, confirming that it is imperative to decompose within- and between-person 
covariation when exploring the origins and outcomes of emotions. As epistemic emotions are 
essentially situation-dependent (i.e., they change over time in response to variations in external 
situations and internal states), we contend that more research is needed that investigates these 
emotions using within-person perspectives. This is likely to be true for achievement emotions as 
well (Pekrun, 2006). 
Our experimental approach of using tasks tapping into common misconceptions to induce 
high-confidence errors reliably elicited both epistemic and achievement emotions. To further 
probe the robustness of the present findings across different sources of cognitive incongruity, it 
would be useful to replicate the results using different methods. For example, cognitive 
incongruity could be induced by confronting persons with information that contradicts their 
profound personal beliefs (Muis, Pekrun, et al., 2015) or by confronting them with unexpected 
outcomes in various tasks (e.g., unexpected device malfunctions; D’Mello & Graesser, 2014).  
The findings highlight the importance of epistemic emotions in knowledge acquisition 
(Brun et al., 2008). They suggest that both positive and negative epistemic emotions can promote 
knowledge exploration, given that both curiosity and confusion had positive effects in our studies. 
However, it is an important task for future research to examine the impact of other negative 
emotions. In contrast to confusion, negative emotions such as anxiety and frustration likely have 
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negative effects on knowledge exploration. Similarly, it will be important to examine the role of 
arousal. Specifically, future research should investigate the influence of deactivating emotions, 
such as relaxation and boredom, in addition to the activating emotions surprise, curiosity, and 
confusion considered here. 
Our research demonstrates the impact of epistemic emotions on one specific type of 
knowledge exploration, namely, seeking access to correct solutions and additional information on 
the topic. To further understand the role of epistemic emotions in knowledge generation, future 
research should consider other types of knowledge exploration. For example, it would be 
interesting to examine whether surprise, curiosity and – possibly – confusion also promote 
exploration of information that is not just ‘one click away’ but that requires more complex and 
continued search for information on the internet or in libraries. In a similar vein, one important 
step for future research involves replicating the present findings for different types of tasks, 
including, for instance, physical exploration of space and objects (e.g., exploring a hallway that 
provides a surprising but illusionary impression that the floor is uneven).  
The extended time span required for such types of exploratory behaviors could lead to 
more complex cognitive and emotional processes including recursive feedback loops of epistemic 
emotions, their antecedents, and their effects (see also D’Mello & Graesser, 2012). For example, 
surprise and curiosity prompted by high-confidence errors could lead individuals to search the 
internet for the correct answer, and this search, in turn, could lead to further surprises, new 
information gaps, and continued curiosity. Alternatively, continued failure to find the correct 
answer may result in persistent confusion and promote negative emotions such as frustration and 
boredom, which can eventually prompt the individual to give up and stop searching.  
To more fully understand the role of epistemic emotions in knowledge generation, it 
would also be important to analyze their impact on other processes underlying knowledge 
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generation (e.g., cognitive problem solving and memory processes). Expanding the focus of 
future studies in this way presents a new avenue for interdisciplinary research on epistemic 
emotions. In fact, recent work in cognitive science, cognitive neuroscience, and computer science 
has begun to explore curiosity as a factor that is critically important to facilitate knowledge 
generation (e.g., Gruber et al., 2014; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016; Oudeyer, Gottlieb, & Lopes, in 
press; Stahl & Feigenson, 2015).  
Regarding implications for practice, our research focused on the origins and outcomes of 
emotional states, which might be more amenable to interventions than emotional traits. As such, 
the present findings provide an important step towards formulating basic guidelines for practical 
interventions. For example, the findings suggest that teachers should pay close attention to 
learners’ epistemic emotions to foster their self-regulated knowledge generation. According to 
the findings, including surprising elements in learning situations (e.g., classroom instruction, 
museum visits) may benefit learning by prompting curiosity and engagement with learning 
material through exploration (Loewenstein, 1994). Surprise and curiosity could, for example, be 
triggered by violating expectations (e.g., challenging naïve theories) to induce cognitive 
incongruity. However, our findings also call for a closer look at confusion. As expected, our 
findings show that surprising events can not only trigger curiosity but also confusion, which may 
not always foster knowledge generation. Future research should examine how the present 
findings translate into antecedents and outcomes of epistemic emotions in real-life settings (e.g., 
classrooms and occupational contexts), and how they could be used to design settings that 
promote epistemic emotions and knowledge exploration.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Within- and Between-Person Correlations    
 Mcor SDcor Minc SDinc Mtot SDtot ICC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Variable Study 1 
1 Accuracy 1 -- -- -- -- 0.54 0.50  .022 -- . 357*    -.310     -.036     -.200     -- -- -- 
2 Confidence 3.80 0.85 3.76 0.66 3.79 1.38  .230  .005    --  .016      .089      .172      .327*    -- -- 
3 Surprise 1.63 0.61 2.65 0.80 2.10 1.17  .224 -.432*** . .079**   --  .523***  .828***  .358*    -- -- 
4 Curiosity 1.93 0.76 3.01 0.91 2.43 1.17  .292 -.455*** -.094**    .531*** --  .531***  .564** -- -- 
5 Confusion 1.17 0.30 2.23 0.76 1.67 1.04  .185 -.507***  .221***  .687***  .485*** --  .264    -- -- 
6 Motivation to 
explore 2 
-- -- 3.76 0.53  --  --  .162 --      .360***  .366***  .317***  .336*** -- -- -- 
 Study 2 
1 Accuracy 1 -- -- -- -- 0.57 0.50  .020 --  .614*** -.312** -.147** -.246*** .  .016 -.237*** -- 
2 Confidence 3.81 0.66 3.70 0.50 3.78 0.58  .158  .021 -- -.056 -.020 -.067     .186*** -.164**   .127* 
3 Surprise 1.44 0.44 2.67 0.74 1.97 0.52  .178 -.519***  .123*** --  .699***  .797***     .497***  .548***  .152** 
4 Curiosity 1.92 0.79 3.13 0.91 2.43 0.77  .310 -.518*** -.054**    .585*** --  .643***  .510***  .393***   .357*** 
5 Confusion 1.17 0.21 2.33 0.71 1.67 0.39  .136 -.554***  .229***  .749***  .558*** --  .493***  .674***   .216***  
6 Pride 2.41 0.97 1.06 0.20 1.83 0.59  .251  .661***  .130*** -.409*** -.385*** -.461*** --  .310*** -.190*** 
7 Shame 1.04 0.16 1.66 0.73 1.31 0.38  .234 -.450***  .113***  .413***  .304***  .455*** -.400*** --   .097* 
8 Exploration 2, 3 -- -- 0.96 0.11  --  --  .181 --  .088***  .131***  .191***  .119*** -.012***    .010 -- 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 Study 3 
1 Accuracy 1 -- -- -- -- 0.52  0.50  .028 -- .779***  .026  .134 . .357  .366*   .130 -.038 
2 Confidence 3.65 0.59 3.80 0.51 3.73 1.42  .141 -.075*** --  .044  .029   .114  .244*  .146   .070 
3 Surprise 1.66 0.42 2.76 0.59 2.18 1.30  .100 -.447***  .204*** --  .655*** .821***  .414**    .560***  .318** 
4 Curiosity 2.25 0.78 3.15 0.83 2.68 1.35  .325 -.404***  .014 .607*** -- .606***  .301**  .380***  
.720***  
5 Confusion 1.15 0.62 2.09 0.54 1.60 1.05  .099 -.473***  .305*** .676***  .462*** --  .514***  .734***  .307** 
6 Pride 2.17 0.86 1.03 0.09 1.63 1.06  .222  .601***  .070** -.321*** -.252*** -.355*** -- .41**    .068 
7 Shame 1.05 0.11 1.52 0.54 1.27 0.71  .153 -.362***  .148*** .352***  .295*** . .378*** -.312*** --  .285** 
8 Exploration4 1.47 0.93 1.80 0.83 1.63 1.17  .568 -.213*** -.015 .310***  .447***  .253*** -.100***  .119*** -- 
Note. Means and SDs are estimated sample statistics on the between-person level. ICC = Intraclass correlation coefficient. Within-person correlations appear 
below the diagonal; between-person correlations appear above the diagonal. 1 Proportion of correct answers per person (range = .15-.75, .25-.90, and .20-.80 in 
Studies 1, 2, and 3, respectively). 2 Coefficients for exploration after incorrect answers (no assessment of exploration after correct answers in Studies 1 and 2). 3 
Proportion of requests for information after incorrect answers relative to the number of incorrect answers (range 0-1). On average, participants answered 8.57 (SD 
= 2.59) out of 20 questions incorrectly. Out of these incorrectly answered questions, they explored 8.23 (SD = 2.62) on average questions (i.e., 96% of the 
incorrectly answered items). 4 Mean of the sum score of explorations (range 0-3). On average, participants answered 9.66 (SD = 2.50) out of 20 questions 
incorrectly. For these incorrectly answered items, they explored 1.63 (SD = 1.17) pieces of information on average. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Table 2 
Path Coefficients for Epistemic Emotions in Model 1  
 Surprise  Curiosity  Confusion 
Predictor b ß p 95% CI  b ß p 95% CI  b ß p 95% CI 
 Study 1 
Accuracy -.472 -.399 .000 [-.442, -.356]  -.508 -.428 .000 [-.473, -.384]  -.508 -.483 .000 [-.517, -.448] 
Confidence .104 .078 .000 [.042, .114]  -.125 -.094 .001 [-.138, -.049]  .262 .221 .000 [.188, .254] 
Accuracy x 
Confidence 
-.494 -.420 .000 [-.463, -.377]  -.282 -.239 .000 [-.280, -.198]  -.332 -.317 .000 [-.355, -.280]   
Confidence in 
incorrect answers 
.425 .503 .000 [.448, .557]  .106 .145 .000 [.073, .217]  .406 .030 .000 [.451, .550] 
Confidence in correct 
answers 
-.289 -.479 .000 [-.338, -.241]  -.256 -.365 .000 [-.306, -.207]  -.077   -.234 .000 [-.106, -.047] 
Order .031 .152    .000 [.125, .180]  .023 .113 .000 [.079, .146]  .021 .115 .000 [.090, .140] 
 Study 2 
Accuracy -.625 -.535 .000 [-.555, -.515]  -.605 -.524 .000 [-.547, -.502]   -.596 -.570 .000 [-.587, -.553] 
Confidence .165  .132 .000 [.114, .149]  -.055 -.044 .001 [-.067, -.022]  .268  .239 .000 [.222, .256]   
Accuracy x 
Confidence 
-.495 -.423 .000 [-.441, -.406]  -.296 -.257 .000 [-.276, -.238]  -.385 -.368 .000 [-.386, -.351] 
Confidence in 
incorrect answers 
.504 .588 .000 [.563, .613]  .182 .270 .000 [.235, .305]  .475 .601 .000 [.575, .626] 
Confidence in correct 
answers 
-.204 -.417 .000 [-.444, -.390]   -.208 -.333 .000 [-.362, -.304]  -.069 -.217 .000 [-.247, -.186] 
Order .000 .002 .870 [-.014, .017]  .000 -.002 .863 [-.017, .014]  .002 .013 .098 [.000,  .026] 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Study 3 
Accuracy -.538 -.432 .000 [-.470, -.394]    -.455 -.404 .000 [-.438, -.369]  -.459 -.451 .000 [-.481, -.421] 
Confidence .227  .171 .000 [.142,  .171]  -.021 -.017 .384 [-.049, .015]  .294  .271 .000 [.242, .299] 
Accuracy x 
Confidence 
-.646 -.520 .000 [-.551, -.489]  -.426 -.379 .000 [-.411, -.346]  -.354 -.349 .000 [-.376, -.322] 
Confidence in 
incorrect answers 
.647 .667 .000 [.633, .701]  .308 .399 .000 [.350, .449]  .484 .565 .000 [.530, .600] 
Confidence in correct 
answers 
-.322 -.517 .000 [-.559, -.475]  -.328 -.431 .000 [-.476, -.387]  -.058 -.153 .000 [-.200, -.107] 
Order -.002 -.009 .532 [-.032; .014]  .002 .009 .630 [-.021, .038]  -.007 -.041 .004 [-.064, -.018] 
Note. b = unstandardized path coefficient. ß = standardized coefficient, p = p-value, CI = confidence interval.  
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Table 3  
Path Coefficients for Achievement Emotions in Model 1 
 Pride  Shame 
Predictor b ß p 95% CI  b ß p 95% CI 
 Study 2 
Accuracy .676 .662 .000 [.643, .682]  -.316 -.457 .000 [-.480, -.434] 
Confidence .128 .117 .000 [.096, .138]  .090 .122 .000 [.101, .143] 
Accuracy x 
Confidence 
.129 .127 .000 [.103, .150]  -.109 -.158 .000 [-.183, -.132] 
Confidence in 
incorrect answers 
.002 .010 .679 [-.029, .048]  .159 .301 .000 [.269, .333] 
Confidence in correct 
answers 
.159 .285   .000 [.244, .326]  -.017 -.126 .000 [-.159, -.092] 
Order .002 .000 .204 [-.003, .026]  .000 -.001 .902 [-.017, .015] 
 Study 3 
Accuracy .571 .609 .000 [.573, .645]   -.234 -.352 .000 [-.389, .314] 
Confidence .116 .116 .000 [.086, .147]  .086 .122 .000 [.089, .154] 
Accuracy x 
Confidence 
.121 .130 .000 [.088, .172]  -.110 -.166 .000 [-.208, .124] 
Confidence in 
incorrect answers 
.007 .046 .149 [-.006, .099]  .142 .249 .000 [.205, .293] 
Confidence in correct 
answers 
.178 .276 .000 [.222, .330]  -.011 -.054 .057 [-.100, .007] 
Order .004 .023 .137 [-.002, .049]   -.003 -.029 .059 [-.053, -.004] 
Note. b = unstandardized path coefficient. ß = standardized coefficient, p = p-value, CI = confidence interval.  
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Table 4 
Path Coefficients for Model 2 in Studies 1 and 2 
Path b ß p 95% CI 
 Study 1  
Conf-Sur (a) .429 .506 .000 [.452, .560] 
Conf-Cur  -.046 -.063 .194 [-.142, .017] 
Conf-Con  .196 .240 .000 [.175, .306] 
Conf-Mot  .200 .249 .000 [.177, .321] 
Sur-Cur (b) .358 .416 .000 [.344, .487] 
Sur-Con (c) .499 .520 .000 [.455, .584] 
Cur-Mot (d) .247 .225 .000 [.151, .298] 
Con-Mot (e) .104 .106 .008 [.040, .172] 
Sur-Cur-Mot (b + d) .088 --- .000 [.056, .121] 
Sur-Con-Mot (c + e) .052 --- .010 [.019, .085] 
Conf-Sur-Cur-Mot (a + b + d) .038 --- .000 [.023, .053] 
Conf-Sur-Con-Mot (a + c + e) .022 --- .017 [.007, .038] 
 Study 2  
Conf-Sur (a) .504 .588 .000 [.563, .613] 
Conf-Cur  .005 .008 .752 [-.032, .048] 
Conf-Con  .222 .280 .000 [.249, .311] 
Conf-Pri .002 .010 .680 [-.029, .048] 
Conf-Sha .159 .301 .000 [.269, .333] 
Conf-Expl  .004 .030 .320 [-.020, .081] 
Sur-Cur (b)   .350 .446 .000 [.403, .488] 
Sur-Con (c) .503 .545 .000 [.513, .577] 
Cur-Expl (d) .032 .171 .000 [.126, .217] 
Con-Expl (e) .005   .034 .154 [-.005, .073] 
Pri-Expl (h) -.008 -.011 .756 [-.069, .047] 
Sha-Expl (i) -.007 -.029 .114 [-.060, .001] 
Sur-Cur-Expl (b + d) .011 --- .000 [.007, .015] 
Sur-Con-Expl (c + e) .003 --- .156 [.000, .006] 
Conf-Sur-Cur-Expl (a + b + d) .006 --- .000 [.004, .007] 
Conf-Sur-Con-Expl (a + c + e) .001 --- .154 [.000, .003] 
Note. Conf = confidence; Sur = surprise; Cur = curiosity; Con = confusion; Pri = pride; Sha = shame; Mot = 
motivation to explore; Expl = exploration. Letters in parentheses denote paths predicted by the main hypotheses (see 
Figure 1). b = unstandardized path coefficient. ß = standardized coefficient. CI = confidence interval.   
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Table 5 
Path Coefficients for Model 2 in Study 3 
 Incorrect answers  Correct answers 
Path b ß p Path  b ß p Path 
 Study 3 
Conf-Sur (a) .647 .667 .000 [.633, .701]  -.322 -.517 .000 [-.559, -.475] 
Conf-Cur  .014 .018 .609 [-.041, .078]  -.206 -.271 .000 [-.324, -.217] 
Conf-Con  .179 .210 .000 [.161, .258]  .014 .038 .343 [ -.028, .103] 
Conf-Pri .007 .046 .149 [-.006, .099]  .178 .276 .000 [ .222, .330 ] 
Conf-Sha .141 .249 .000 [.205, .292]  -.011 -.054 .056 [-.100, -.007] 
Conf-Expl  .010 .020 .575 [-.038, .078]  -.049 -.081 .027 [-.141, -.021] 
Sur-Cur (b) .455 .571 .000 [.503, .638]  .378 .310 .000 [.257, .364] 
Sur-Con (c) .470 .532 .000 [.479, .586]  .224 .370 .000 [.280, .460] 
Cur-Expl (d) .215 .316 .000 [.258, .373]  .304 .383 .000 [.323, .444] 
Con-Expl (e) .061 .100 .008 [.038, .162]  .081 .051 .054 [.007, .094] 
Pri-Expl (h) -.109 -.032 .377 [-.092, .028]  .080 .085 .004 [.036, .134] 
Sha-Expl (i) -.007 -.008 .820 [-.064, .049]  -.165 -.058 .176 [-.128, .012] 
Sur-Cur-Expl (b + d) .098 --- .000 [.075, .120]  .115 --- .000 [.087, .143] 
Sur-Con-Expl (c + e) .029 --- .010 [.010, .047]  .018 --- .058 [.002, .034] 
Conf-Sur-Cur-Expl 
(a + b + d) 
.063 
--- 
.000 [.048, .078]  -.037 
--- 
.000 [-.047, -.027] 
Conf-Sur-Con-Expl 
(a + c + e) 
.019 
--- 
.010 [.007, .031]  -.006 
--- 
.058 [-.011, -.001] 
Note. Conf = confidence; Sur = surprise; Cur = curiosity; Con = confusion; Pri = pride; Sha = shame; Mot = 
motivation to explore; Expl = exploration. Letters in parentheses denote paths predicted by the main hypotheses (see 
Figure 1). b = unstandardized path coefficient. ß = standardized coefficient. CI = confidence interval. 
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Figure 1. Main hypotheses. Pride is expected to occur after correct answers and to promote 
exploration after these answers. Shame is expected to occur after incorrect answers; no prediction 
is made for the direction of effects of shame on exploration.     
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Figure 2. Relations between confidence in incorrect answers, epistemic emotions, and 
exploration at the within-person level (Model 2) in Studies 1 (upper panel) and 2 (lower panel). 
Residuals and correlations between emotions are not depicted. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Figure 3. Relations between confidence in incorrect answers, epistemic emotions, and 
exploration at the within-person level in Study 3. inc = path coefficients for incorrect answers 
(Model 2a). cor = path coefficients for correct answers (Model 2b). Residuals and correlations 
between emotions are not depicted. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Test of Alternative Models  
To further investigate the robustness of findings concerning the interplay of surprise, curiosity, and confusion, we 
additionally estimated two alternative models for each study. Specifically, in Model 2 depicted in the main text, surprise predicted 
curiosity and confusion, and curiosity and confusion, in turn, predicted exploration. In Models 3 and 4 described here, we changed 
this sequence. In Model 3, curiosity predicted surprise and confusion, and these two emotions predicted exploration. In Model 4, 
confusion predicted surprise and curiosity, and these two emotions predicted exploration. Other than that, Models 3 and 4 had the 
same structure as Model 2 (see Figure 1, main text). To estimate Models 3 and 4, we used the same data analytic procedures as for 
Model 2 (see the Method sections of Studies 1-3, main text).  
For Studies 1 and 2, the three models were estimated for confidence, emotions, and exploration after incorrect answers; 
exploration had not been examined after correct answers in these studies, For Study 3, the models were estimated both for 
incorrect and correct answers.    
As reported in the main text and summarized in Table S1, Model 2 (surprise first) had a very good fit across all four 
analyses. In contrast, Model 3 (curiosity first) did not fit the data. Model 4 (confusion) first had a good fit in Studies 1 and 2 but 
had a substantially worse fit than Model 2 in the analyses for Study 3, both in the analysis for incorrect and correct answers. 
Given that Model 2 was the only one that showed an excellent fit across all analyses, we decided to keep this model and report it 
in the main text.   
 
Table S1. Fit Indexes of Alternative Models 
Model CFI TLI RMSEA SRMRwithin 
 
Study 1 
2 – Surprise first .997      .935 .055 .010 
3 – Curiosity first .987 .673 .123 .037 
4 – Confusion first .999   .970 .037 .007 
 
Study 2 
2 – Surprise first 1.00   .980 .024 .003 
3 – Curiosity first .990 .526 .114 .021 
4 – Confusion first 1.00   1.00 .000 .001 
 
Study 3 – Incorrect answers 
2 – Surprise first 1.00   1.00 .000   .003 
3 – Curiosity first .965 -.694 .233 .032 
4 – Confusion first .998     .920   .051 .007 
 
Study 3 – Correct answers 
2 – Surprise first 1.00   1.00 .000   .003 
3 – Curiosity first .957 -1.10 .192 .046 
4 – Confusion first .996  .804 .051 .006 
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Table S2. Trivia Task Items with English Translation  
Item Question Correct Answer Additional information 1 Additional information 2 
1 Jupiter ist der größte Planet 
unseres Sonnensystems. [richtig] 
Der Gasriese Jupiter ist mit einem 
Äquatordurchmesser von 142.800 
Kilometern der größte Planet des 
Sonnensystems. 
Als eines der hellsten Objekte des 
Nachthimmels ist er nach dem 
römischen Hauptgott Jupiter 
benannt. 
Für einen Umlauf um die Sonne 
benötigt Jupiter 11 Jahre, 315 
Tage und 3 Stunden. 
Jupiter is the largest planet in our 
solar system. [correct] 
With an equatorial diameter of 
142,800 kilometers, gas giant 
Jupiter is the largest planet in the 
solar system. 
As one of the brightest objects in 
the night sky, Jupiter is named 
after the chief deity of Roman 
religion. 
It takes Jupiter 11 years, 315 days 
and three hours to orbit the Sun. 
     
2 Die legendären einäugigen Riesen 
aus der griechischen Mythologie 
werden nicht Zyklopen genannt. 
[richtig] 
Zyklopen sind Gestalten der 
griechischen Mythologie mit 
kreisrunden Augen oder einem 
Einzelauge auf der Stirn. 
Die bekannteren Zyklopen, denen 
Odysseus auf seiner Irrfahrt 
(Odyssee) begegnete, waren die 
Söhne des Poseidon. 
Der Fund von Elefantenschädeln 
deren Nasenöffnungen als 
Augenhöhlen interpretiert wurden, 
begründete die Legende der 
Zyklopen.  
The legendary one-eyed giants in 
Greek mythology are not called 
cyclopes. [correct]    
In Greek mythology, cyclopes are 
creatures with round eyes, or with 
a single eye on their forehead. 
The more famous cyclopes were 
the sons of Poseidon and those 
which Odysseus encountered on 
his Odyssey. 
The cyclopes myth was inspired 
by the discovery of elephant 
skulls that had large nasal cavities 
interpreted as eye sockets.   
     
3 Der Rio Grande ist nicht der 
längste Fluss Südamerikas. 
[richtig] 
Der aus den Anden nach Osten 
fließende Amazonas ist mit 6.448 
km der längste Fluss 
Südamerikas. 
Der Amazonas ist mit einer 
mittleren Wasserführung von 
209.000 m³/s der wasserreichste 
Fluss der ganzen Welt... 
Der Rio Grande entspringt  in den 
Rocky Mountains und fließt durch 
New Mexico  Richtung Süden. 
The Rio Grande is not the longest 
river in South America. [correct]    
Flowing eastwards from the 
Andes Mountains, the Amazon is 
the longest river in South America 
(4,007 miles).  
With an average discharge volume 
of 209,000 m³/s, the Amazon is 
the largest river by discharge 
volume of water in the world. 
From its sources in the Rocky 
Mountains, the Rio Grande flows 
through New Mexico and towards 
the South. 
     
4 Da Vinci bemalte die Decke der 
sixtinischen Kapelle. [falsch] 
Die Deckenmalereien malte 
Michelangelo Buonarroti 
zwischen 1508 und 1512 im 
Auftrag von Papst Julius II.  
Besonders der Ausschnitt, in dem 
Gott mit ausgestrecktem Finger 
Adam zum Leben erweckt, ist 
berühmt. 
Mona Lisa (original La Gioconda) 
ist der deutsche Titel des 
berühmten Gemäldes von da 
Vinci.  
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The ceiling of the Sistine Chapel 
was painted by Da Vinci. 
[iIncorrect] 
Michelangelo Buonarroti painted 
the ceiling between 1508 and 
1512 commissioned by Pope 
Julius II. 
The part depicting God stretching 
his finger to endow Adam with 
life is especially famous.  
The German title of Da Vinci’s 
famous portrait is Mona Lisa 
(original title: La Gioconda). 
     
5 In Australien läuft das 
Badewasser gleichherum ab wie 
in Europa. [richtig] 
Die Badewannenstrudel in 
Australien sind viel zu schnell, um 
durch die Erdrotation beeinflusst 
zu werden. 
Durch die Erdrotation werden 
unter anderem die Winde aus ihrer 
ursprünglichen Richtung 
abgelenkt ( Coriolis-Kraft). 
Die Corioliskraft führt dazu, dass 
auf der Nordhalbkugel Flussufer 
in Fließrichtung rechts stärker 
erodiert werden. 
In Australia, water swirls down 
the plughole in the same direction 
as in Europe. [correct] 
In Australia, the water swirls 
down the plughole much too fast 
to be affected by Earth’s rotation.  
One of the effects of Earth’s 
rotation is that it causes the 
direction of winds to be deflected 
from their original direction 
(Coriolis force).  
Due to the Coriolis force, rivers in 
the northern hemisphere erode 
more strongly along their right 
bank in the direction of flow. 
     
6 Zündhölzer sind nicht moderner 
als Feuerzeuge. [falsch] 
Während das erste Feuerzeug 
1823 gefertigt wurde, entstanden 
die ersten Sicherheitszündhölzer 
erst im Jahr 1848. 
Die Urform des Feuerzeuges 
(Döbereiner-Feuerzeug) erfand 
der Döbereiner, der an der 
Universität Jena lehrte. 
Zündhölzer haben gegenüber 
Gasfeuerzeugen generell den 
großen Vorteil, dass sie auch bei 
strengem Frost funktionieren. 
Matches were not invented before 
lighters. [incorrect] 
While the first lighter was devised 
in 1823, the first matches were 
only manufactured in 1848. 
The prototype of all lighters, the 
“Döbereiner lamp”, was invented 
by Döbereiner, who taught at the 
University of Jena. 
One of the general advantages of 
matches over butane lighters is 
that they also work in freezing 
temperatures.  
     
7 Die Berliner Gedächtniskirche hat 
ihren Namen bekommen, weil sie 
an den Krieg erinnern soll. 
[falsch] 
Die Berliner Gedächtniskirche, 
wie die Kaiser-Wilhelm-
Gedächtniskirche 
umgangssprachlich genannt wird, 
ist  Gedenkstätte für Wilhelm I. 
Der Grundstein für die 
Gedächtniskirche wurde  gelegt, 
um an den Geburtstag des 
Namensgebers zu erinnern. 
Die Ruine des im zweiten 
Weltkrieg komplett zerstörten 
Hauptturmes der 
Gedächtniskirche wurde als 
Mahnmal erhalten.  
The Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial 
Church (Berliner 
Gedächtniskirche) received its 
name as an anti-war memorial. 
[incorrect] 
The “Berliner Gedächtniskirche”, 
as the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial 
Church is often referred to 
colloquially, is a memorial for 
Wilhelm I. 
The cornerstone of the Memorial 
Church was laid in memory of its 
namesake’s birthday.  
The original west tower of the 
Memorial Church has remained 
standing as a ruin and anti-war 
memorial. 
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8 Ketchup ist eine amerikanische 
Erfindung. [falsch] 
Der Ursprung von Ketchup ist 
eine chinesische Sauce aus 
eingelegten Schalentieren, ihr 
Name war „Kê-tsiap“. 
Erstmals tauchte der Begriff im 
englischen Sprachraum in einem 
Wörterbuch Ende des 17. 
Jahrhunderts auf. 
 In Deutschland wurde Ketchup 
nach 1945 durch die britischen 
und auch amerikanischen 
Besatzungssoldaten breiter 
bekannt.  
Ketchup is an American 
invention. [incorrect] 
Ketchup was originally developed 
from „kê-tsiap“, a Chinese sauce 
derived from fermented shellfish 
In the English-speaking world, the 
word first appeared in dictionaries 
towards the end of the 17th 
century. 
In Germany, Ketchup became 
more widely known after 1945 
due to the British and American 
occupation.  
     
9 Das Sternbild, das wie ein 
fliegendes Pferd aussieht, heißt 
Zentaurus. [falsch] 
Pegasus ist ein Sternbild am 
Herbsthimmel, das ein auf dem 
Kopf stehendes fliegendes Pferd 
darstellt. 
Das Sternbild Pegasus fällt vor 
allem dadurch auf, das seine 
Hauptsterne ein Quadrat bilden. 
Der Zentaur ist ein Sternbild am 
Südhimmel, das ein Mischwesen 
aus Pferd und Mensch darstellt.  
The constellation resembling a 
winged horse is called Centaurus. 
[incorrect] 
Pegasus is a constellation in the 
northern sky which depicts an 
upside-down winged horse. 
Most notable about the Pegasus 
constellation is the square formed 
by its four main stars, 
The Centaurus is a constellation in 
the southern sky depicting a 
creature that is part human, part 
horse. 
     
10 
 
Sokrates wurde mit Hilfe des 
Schierlingsbechers hingerichtet. 
[richtig] 
Schierlingsbecher ist eine 
Vergiftung, bei der einem Getränk 
der Saft des Gefleckten 
Schierlings beigemischt wird.  
Der Schierling gehört zu den 
giftigsten einheimischen 
Pflanzenarten, dessen Wirkstoff 
(das Alkaloid Coniin) tödlich ist. 
Sokrates war ein für das 
abendländische Denken sehr 
grundlegender griechischer 
Philosoph, der in Athen lebte. 
Socrates was sentenced to die by 
drinking the hemlock cup. 
[correct] 
Hemlock cup poisoning involves 
mixing a drink with poisonous 
spotted hemlock. 
Containing the deadly toxin 
Coniine (an alkaloid), the 
hemlock is one of the most 
poisonous deadly plants. 
Socrates was a very influential 
Greek philosopher in terms of 
impacting Western thinking, and 
lived in Athens. 
     
11 In Indien wird nicht mit Kopeken 
bezahlt. [richtig] 
In Indien wird von der Regierung 
und der Zentralbank die indische 
Rupie als Währung ausgegeben.  
Die Einführung der indischen 
Rupie geht auf den damaligen 
Herrscher Afghan Sher Shah Suri 
zurück. 
Kopeke ist der Name einer seit 
dem 16. Jahrhundert 
ausgegebenen Kleinmünze des 
ehemaligen Russischen Reichs. 
The copeck is not the official 
currency of India. [correct] 
The official currency issued by 
the Indian government and central 
bank is the Indian rupee. 
The Indian rupee was introduced 
by the medieval ruler Afghan Sher 
Shah Suri.  
Copeck is the name of a coin that 
was introduced in the 16th century 
and formed part of the currency of 
the former Russian Empire.  
Epistemic Emotions and Knowledge Exploration – Supplemental Materials 
62 
 
12 Versailles wurde nicht von König 
Louis XIV erbaut. [falsch] 
Der Bau des Schlosses von 
Versailles war Teil von Louis 
Strategie zur Zentralisierung der 
Macht. 
Versailles ist einer der größten 
Paläste Europas und gilt als einer 
der Höhepunkte europäischer 
Schlossbaukunst. 
Seit 1979 ist das Schloss Teil des 
UNESCO- 
Weltkulturerbes,welches  
durchschnittlich  drei Millionen 
Besucher hat.  
Versailles was not built by King 
Louis XIV. [incorrect] 
Building the Palace of Versailles 
was part of Louis’ strategy for 
centralizing power. 
Versailles is one of the largest 
Palaces in Europe and is 
considered one of the highlights 
of European castle architecture. 
In 1979, the Palace was inscribed 
into the list of UNESCO World 
Heritage Sites and has an average 
of three million visitors. 
     
13 Chamäleons passen Ihre Farbe der 
Umgebung an. [falsch] 
 
Chamäleons passen ihre Farbe 
normalerweise nicht der 
Umgebung an, sondern wechseln 
sie entsprechend ihrer Stimmung. 
Durch unterschiedliche Färbungen 
können sich Chamäleons ihren 
Artgenossen mitteilen, so 
signalisieren sie zum Beispiel 
Paarungsbereitschaft.  
Der Farbwechsel der Chamäleons 
kann auch der Tarnung dienen, ist 
aber nicht die eigentliche 
Funktion. 
Chameleons can adapt their skin 
coloring to their environmental 
surroundings. . [incorrect] 
Chameleons usually do not adapt 
their skin coloring to their 
environmental surroundings, but 
change their coloring according to 
their mood. 
Chameleons can communicate 
with other members of their 
species by changing their 
coloring, for instance, to signal 
their readiness to mate.  
Color change in chameleons can 
serve as camouflage, but this is 
not its actual main function. 
     
14 Die Ägypter schrieben im Alltag 
nicht in Hieroglyphen. . [richtig] 
Die Ägypter schrieben im Alltag 
nicht in Hieroglyphen, sondern 
benutzten eine so genannte 
„hieratische“ Schrift. 
Hieroglyphen sind Zeichen des 
ältesten bekannten ägyptischen 
Schriftsystems, das den Charakter 
einer reinen Bilderschrift hatte. 
Die hieratische Schrift ist ebenso 
alt wie die Hieroglyphenschrift 
und eine eher kursive Variante 
davon. 
Egyptians did not use hieroglyphs 
in everyday writing. [correct] 
Egyptians did not use hieroglyphs 
in everyday writing, but relied on 
so-called “hieratic” script. 
The oldest Egyptian writing 
system known today is made up of 
hieroglyphic symbols and 
resembles purely pictographic 
script.   
Hieratic script is as old as 
hieroglyphic writing, and presents 
a cursive variant of the latter.   
     
15 Mozart hieß mit Vornamen 
Joannes Chrysostomus 
Wolfgangus Theophilus. [richtig] 
Mozart nannte sich Wolfgang 
Amade, ist aber eigentlich auf den 
Namen Johannes Chrysostomus 
Wolfgangus getauft. 
Schon als Mozart fünf Jahre alt 
war, zeichnete Vater Leopold 
Musikstücke als "Wolfgangerls 
Compositiones" auf. 
Der Komponist starb am 5. 
Dezember 1791 im Alter von fast 
36 Jahren in Wien.  
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 Mozart’s first name was Joannes 
Chrysostomus Wolfgangus 
Theophilus. [correct] 
Mozart called himself Wolfgang 
Amade, but he was actually 
christened Johannes 
Chrysostomus Wolfgangus. 
When Mozart was five years old, 
his father Leopold already 
recorded his musical pieces under 
the name “Wolfgangerls 
Compositiones”. 
The composer died in Vienna on 
December 5, 1791 at almost 36 
years of age.  
     
16 Der Ursprung des Wortes 
"Hängematte" kommt nicht von 
"hängende Matte. [richtig] 
"Hängematte" kommt von 
"hamaca", wie sie von den 
Erfindern, den südamerikanischen 
Indiandern, gemeinhin genannt 
wurde. 
An Land bot die Hängematte 
Schutz vor Feuchtigkeit und in der 
Schifffahrt eine platzsparende 
Schlafgelegenheit. 
Alle Hängematten lassen sich 
nach Art der Liegefläche entweder 
in Tuchhängematten oderin 
Netzhängematten untergliedern. 
The origin of the German word 
“Hängematte” (Engl. hammock) is 
not “hanging matt”. [correct] 
“Hängematte” (Engl. hammock) 
strems from “hamaca”, which was 
the word for hammock commonly 
used by indigenous peoples of 
South America.  
Hammocks offered protection 
against dampness ashore, and 
space-saving sleeping 
accommodation at sea. 
Different types of hammocks can 
be differentiated based on the 
material they are made up of, 
including rope netting or cloth.   
     
17 Nur männliche Löwen können 
Mähnen haben. [falsch] 
Nicht nur männliche Löwen, 
sondern auch alte, nicht mehr 
fruchtbare Weibchen können eine 
Mähne haben. 
Löwen sind eine Art der Katzen, 
die im Unterschied zu anderen 
Katzen in Rudeln leben. 
Löwen sind zwar 
anpassungsfähig, was ihren 
Lebensraum angeht, ihr 
bevorzugter Lebensraum ist 
jedoch die Savanne. 
Only male lions can grow manes. 
[incorrect] 
Manes can be grown not only by 
male lions, but also by older, 
barren lionesses.  
Lions belong to the family of big 
cats, but in contrast to other cats, 
they live in prides. 
When it comes to their natural 
habitat, lions are adaptable, but 
their preferred habitat is the 
savannah. 
     
18 Päpste können keine legitimen 
Kinder haben. [falsch] 
Päpste können Kinder haben, 
denn es steht jedem Witwer mit 
Kindern frei, die Priesterlaufbahn 
einzuschlagen.  
Für das Amt vom Papst kann nach 
dem Kirchenrecht jeder gläubige 
männliche Katholik gewählt 
werden. 
Der Petersdom ist die größte der 
Papstbasiliken Roms und eine der 
bedeutendsten Kirchen der Welt.  
Popes cannot have children 
legitimately. [incorrect] 
Popes can legitimately have 
children since every widower is 
free to enter priesthood. 
According to ecclesiastical law, 
any devout male Catholic can be 
elected pope. 
The St. Peter’s Basilica is the 
largest of the papal basilicas and 
one of the most important 
churches in the world. 
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19 Unsere Ziffern sind ursprünglich 
indisch. [richtig] 
Die Europäer übernahmen die 
Ziffern der Araber, welche diese 
aber wiederum aus Indien 
übernommen hatten. 
Ziffer wird von dem arabischen 
Wort  
aṣ-ṣifr abgeleitet, das aus dem 
Sanskrit śūnyā ) übersetzt wurde.  
In Europa gibt es vor allem zwei 
Darstellungsweisen von Ziffern: 
die Versalziffern und die 
Mediävalziffern.  
Our numerals are of Indian origin. 
[correct] 
The Europeans adopted the Arabic 
numerals which, in turn, were 
adopted from Indian culture. 
The German word “Ziffer” 
(numeral, digit) is derived from 
Arabic aṣ-ṣifr, which is a 
translation of the Sanskrit word 
śūnyā.  
In Europe, two main typefaces are 
distinguished: so-called versal 
numerals and medieval numerals. 
     
20 Englisch ist die gesetzliche 
Amtssprache der USA. [falsch] 
Englisch ist nicht die gesetzliche 
Amtsprache der USA,  denn dort 
gibt es keine offizielle 
Amtssprache. 
In den USA werden 337 Sprachen 
gesprochen oder geschrieben, von 
denen 176 uramerikanischen 
Ursprungs sind.  
Die größte Sprechergemeinschaft 
der USA spricht englisch, die 
zweitgrößte spanisch und die 
drittgrößte chinesisch 
(kantonesisch).  
English is the official language of 
the United States of America. 
[incorrect] 
English is not the official 
language of the United States 
seeing as the US does not have an 
official language.   
In the US, 337 languages are 
spoken or written, 176 of which 
are of Native American origin. 
The most common language 
spoken in the US is English, the 
second most common is Spanish, 
and the third most common is 
Chinese (Cantonese).  
 
 
